Robert Mosbacher, an adviser to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), has voiced strong opposition to President Trump’s proposal to repurpose the agency for domestic mineral production. Mosbacher and other development specialists warn that shifting the DFC’s focus could undermine its core mission of supporting projects in low- and middle-income countries.
On March 20, President Trump issued an executive order invoking emergency authorities to accelerate production of critical minerals. The order is intended to strengthen domestic supply chains for minerals deemed essential to national security and advanced manufacturing. However, development experts worry the move may divert the DFC’s resources and attention away from international development priorities.
Those concerns have grown in light of broader budget and leadership changes. The administration’s proposed $76 billion reduction in funding for USAID programs has unsettled many in the development community, who fear cuts will compound any shift in DFC priorities. At the same time, the nomination of Ben Black as DFC’s chief executive has raised additional questions: Black has been publicly critical of the agency’s support for clean-energy and other green projects, prompting anxiety that the DFC might scale back climate and sustainability investments.
Founded to mobilize private-sector investment in emerging markets, the DFC manages a roughly $50 billion portfolio that includes initiatives in food security, energy, healthcare, and infrastructure. More than 70% of its financing has historically gone to lower-income nations, where investments are intended to promote economic growth, reduce poverty, and strengthen resilience. That portfolio mix reflects bipartisan support for a development-focused mandate, which many stakeholders argue should remain intact.
Any substantial redirection of DFC resources toward domestic mineral projects would likely encounter institutional and political pushback. The agency’s programs are supported by a wide range of congressional members from both parties, nongovernmental organizations, and private-sector partners who emphasize the long-term benefits of international development work. Critics of the proposed shift emphasize that repurposing the DFC risks undermining ongoing projects, harming partner countries, and diminishing U.S. diplomatic and development influence abroad.
Advocates for maintaining the DFC’s international mission also note practical limitations. The DFC was structured to deploy financing, insurance, and technical assistance in markets where private capital is scarce or hesitant to enter. Redirecting those tools to domestic mineral production could require legal and operational changes, disrupt existing contracts and pipelines, and reduce the agency’s ability to leverage private investment overseas.
Supporters of the administration’s approach argue the urgency of securing critical mineral supplies justifies a reevaluation of federal tools and agencies. They contend that bolstering domestic capacity could protect supply chains vital to defense, clean energy technologies, and emerging industries. Still, even some proponents acknowledge the importance of balancing domestic industrial goals with longstanding international commitments to development and stability.
For now, the debate over the DFC’s future role remains unresolved. Mosbacher and other critics continue to urge caution, recommending that policymakers preserve the agency’s international development mandate while exploring alternative mechanisms to address domestic mineral needs. As conversations proceed in Washington, stakeholders on all sides emphasize the need for clear legal authority, careful impact assessments, and coordination across agencies to avoid unintended consequences for both U.S. domestic policy and global development efforts.