The 1970s produced an extraordinary rally in precious metals driven by several historic developments: President Nixon’s suspension of the dollar’s convertibility to gold, the Coinage Act of 1965, and persistent inflation throughout much of the decade.
Among the many forces that moved markets in that era, the Hunt brothers—Bunker and Herbert Hunt—had an outsized effect on silver and gold prices. Based on research by Mike Maloney, this account highlights lesser-known details of their attempt to corner the silver market and the consequences that followed.
The saga begins with an almost cinematic transfer of bullion. Under moonlight, three unmarked Boeing 707s were staged at LaGuardia Airport while armed guards oversaw the loading of millions of ounces of silver destined for Swiss vaults. This was no 19th-century shipment; it was the 1970s, and the Hunts were moving a massive hoard of silver from the United States to Europe.
The Hunts were sons of H.L. Hunt, a self-made billionaire who had built a fortune in real estate and oil. Bunker and Herbert inherited both resources and ambition. Bunker’s business ventures eventually surpassed his father’s fortune, and after suffering political setbacks—including the nationalization of a Libyan oilfield—he became intensely concerned about the erosion of wealth driven by inflation and government policies.
The Hunt Family Fortune
Bunker and Herbert were part of a large Hunt family whose wealth spanned industries from oil and real estate to agriculture. Bunker’s experiences in the 1960s and early 1970s—losses, political disputes, and perceived threats to private property—shaped his view that physical assets offered better protection against government action and currency debasement than paper assets.
The Rise of Silver
The 1970s environment of inflation, slow growth, and political turmoil set the stage for interest in tangible assets. After mounting U.S. deficits in the mid-1960s and the suspension of the Bretton Woods gold convertibility in 1971, the dollar shifted fully to a fiat regime. Oil embargoes and shortages, rising consumer prices, and fears of prolonged inflation prompted many to seek refuge in commodities.
With gold still largely restricted to private ownership in the early 1970s and viewed as subject to government manipulation, the Hunts turned to silver. Industrial demand for silver was rising while production trended lower, leaving a narrowing supply buffer. The Hunts believed physical commodities would better preserve their wealth than cash or paper investments.
Rather than buying only physical metal, the Hunts used futures contracts to accumulate and control large quantities of silver. Futures provided leverage—magnifying gains but also amplifying losses. Crucially, the Hunts insisted on taking physical delivery of much of their silver rather than settling contracts in cash, preferring to hold tangible metal as protection against currency risk.
By early 1974, the Hunts had acquired futures for roughly 55 million ounces of silver, a sizable share of global supply. With no sufficient domestic storage for their growing hoard, they arranged to transport and store most of it in Switzerland.
Circle K Cowboys Deliver the Goods
To keep the operation secret and secure, the Hunts organized armed transport and careful logistics. A shooting contest at the Circle K Ranch selected a group of cowboys to guard the shipments as armored trucks moved silver to waiting aircraft. The silver was flown to Zurich and placed in the vaults of major Swiss banks and private warehouses. The costs were substantial: chartering jets, anonymous storage fees, and high security added up to millions of dollars annually even while silver prices were relatively low.
News and rumors that a single buyer was taking physical delivery of unprecedented quantities of silver began to ripple through trading floors. Traders increasingly feared manipulation of a market where supply was thin relative to demand, and whispers that the Hunts were attempting to corner the market spread.
The Hunt Brothers Make Their Move…
When Bunker visited the COMEX trading floor in 1974, his presence was unforgettable. He publicly explained his preference for tangible assets over fiat currency. The Hunts kept accumulating silver: by 1976 they had added another 20 million ounces, and by 1979 prices had risen sharply from the levels Bunker first bought at in the early 1970s.
As silver climbed—reaching $17.88 on October 3, 1979—the exchanges became anxious. COMEX and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) held only limited inventories relative to demand. Regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), worried about potential defaults and market disorder. Exchanges raised margin requirements and set limits on the quantity of futures a single trader could hold—moves aimed at curbing speculative concentration.
The Hunts viewed these rule changes as unfair and retaliatory. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve and its chairman pressured banks to curb lending for speculative purposes, effectively constraining the Hunts’ ability to finance further purchases. The Fed’s intervention reflected a broader concern: an unchecked surge in precious metals prices threatened confidence in the dollar and could accelerate inflationary fears.
By late 1979 and early 1980, silver hit extraordinary highs. The Hunts’ positions—together with partners—totaled hundreds of millions of ounces. Exchanges again altered rules, imposing stricter position limits and liquidation deadlines. On January 21, 1980, silver reached a peak of $50 per ounce while gold also rose to record levels, reflecting widespread worry about currency stability.
The Gold Connection
When exchanges moved to restrict buying and limit trading, markets reversed sharply. Silver fell, and pressure on leveraged positions led to margin calls. Despite still owning large quantities of physical silver purchased at lower prices, the Hunts faced enormous losses in the futures market, where their average costs were much higher. In March 1980—known as Silver Thursday—silver plunged, triggering broader market disruption and rumors that the Hunts would liquidate other assets to cover losses.
Ultimately the Hunts incurred huge debts. A consortium of banks, organized with Fed involvement, extended credit to prevent wider financial damage. The brothers faced lawsuits, fines, and bankruptcy proceedings. Bunker Hunt settled with tax authorities and regulators and eventually scaled back his public role, though trusts and prior wealth helped him retain private assets.
Later reviews found that exchanges and regulators had changed rules in response to the crisis, and that conflicts of interest existed among some board members. While public opinion labeled the Hunts manipulators, the episode also showed how regulatory and institutional actions can alter market dynamics abruptly.
Two main lessons emerge from the Hunts’ story. First, timing and risk management matter: heavy leverage can convert gains into catastrophic losses when market conditions change quickly. Second, owning physical metals differs fundamentally from holding leveraged paper claims. For many investors, the episode reinforced the appeal of holding tangible assets outside the direct control of exchanges or counterparties.
The Hunts’ attempt to corner the silver market remains a striking example of how concentrated buying, changing regulations, and macroeconomic pressures can interact to reshape markets. It underscores the limits of even great wealth when leverage, liquidity, and regulatory responses converge against a strategy.